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Abstract: Sexual and reproductive health (SRH) has increasingly gained importance in the ﬁeld of
international human rights law. The work of the United Nations (UN) bodies, in particular the recently
adopted General Comment 22 (GC 22), has been instrumental in signalling the importance of the SRH legal
framework and in setting clear guidelines to steer countries into enacting/modifying/repealing national laws
in order to comply with their international obligations vis-à-vis SRH. Although within the region Uruguay is
regarded as a pioneer in terms of women’s status and rights, including sexual and reproductive health and
rights, evidence points to a number of challenges. This article explores the extent to which the Uruguayan
abortion law complies with the country’s international human rights obligations as conceptualised by GC 22.
It uses the Uruguayan abortion law, its regulatory decree, and the highest administrative court’s decision in
Alonso et al v. Poder Ejecutivo as the main pivots for the discussion. The results reveal that – in spite of the
praise it receives at the international level and the adoption of a less restrictive abortion law – Uruguay has
fallen short in adopting a legal framework that complies with the international standards and guarantees
effective access to abortion services. DOI: 10.1080/09688080.2017.1422664
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Introduction
Uruguay gained international praise in 2012 when
it passed one of the most liberal abortion laws of
the continent. While the law undoubtedly rep-
resents a step in the right direction, the procedural
provisions demand a closer look. A crucial step
toward the fulﬁlment of the rights relating to sex-
ual and reproductive health (SRH) is the removal
of any legal barriers thereto.1 Thus, a critical analy-
sis of the Uruguayan legal framework in light of
human rights standards is essential for the further
modiﬁcation and advancement of these rights in
practice. This article will use international human
rights law – especially the recent General Comment
No. 22 (GC 22)1 – as a framework to discuss the
aforementioned law and whether the require-
ments contained therein form a barrier to
women’s access to reproductive health services,
violating their basic rights.2
The legal framework in Uruguay
With a stable democracy and a longstanding tra-
dition of respect for human rights, Uruguay is con-
sidered a pioneer in the Latin American context.3
The country is a party to all relevant international
instruments that ground SRH and has shown a
strong political commitment to work toward the
effective enjoyment of sexual and reproductive
rights.
Research conducted during the period 1997–
2001 shows that although the maternal mortality
rates of Uruguay were similar to those of compar-
ably developed countries, death from unsafe abor-
tion was the main contributor and among the
highest in the world. Unsafe abortion accounted
for 28% of total maternal deaths, disproportionally
affecting women in vulnerable situations.4
1General Comments are interpretations of the human rights
treaties made by the treaty monitoring bodies. Some scholars
point at the quasi-legislative character of these comments in
the sense that they guide States in the fulﬁlments of their obli-
gations and serve as an authoritative interpretation of the pro-
visions of treaties.
1© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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In response to UN bodies’ concerns about the
high incidence of maternal mortality and its
main cause being unsafe abortion, in 2011 Uru-
guay introduced a “harm-reduction” approach.5
This approach consisted of providing women seek-
ing abortions with a “before-abortion” and an
“after-abortion” visit to a reproductive health poly-
clinic. The application of this model contributed to
the advancement of sexual and reproductive
health and rights (SRHR), particularly regarding
prevention of unsafe abortion.6 It enabled health-
care teams to take a stance in favour of women’s
rights, even within an extremely restrictive abor-
tion framework.
From 1907 to 2012 abortion was considered a
crime in Uruguay and the law imposed a three-
to nine-year prison sentence on women under-
going abortions.7 Nonetheless, this illegality did
not have any deterrent effect: an estimated
30,000 to 50,000 clandestine abortions were
still performed yearly.8 In 2002, there was an
attempt to end criminalisation when an abortion
legalisation bill was discussed in and passed by
the House of Representatives. The bill was, how-
ever, later defeated in the Senate by only four
votes. A new initiative was undertaken in 2006
and, in late 2007 and in 2008, approved by the
Senate and the House of Representatives, respect-
ively. This time the president in power vetoed
the law.9
In 2012, the Voluntary Termination of Preg-
nancy Act (Abortion Law N° 18.987) was adopted.
One month later, Regulatory Decree 375/2012
was introduced, containing further details in
relation to abortion. The law waives criminal
penalties for abortion in the ﬁrst 12 weeks of ges-
tation, provided certain procedural requirements
are met. Where the pregnancy results from rape,
abortion is permitted in the ﬁrst 14 weeks of ges-
tation. No time constraints apply if the health of
the mother is endangered or the embryo is
unviable.
The abortion law has since been the target of
many legal and political challenges. In June
2013, anti-abortion advocates attempted to over-
turn it by calling for a referendum that, in the
end, fell signiﬁcantly short of the percentage-
threshold needed to succeed.10 Moreover, in July
2013, several doctors challenged Decree 375/
2012, arguing that it unduly restricts their right
to freedom of thought. When doing so, the doctors
sought to have 10 out of the 42 articles included
in the Decree annulled (Alonso et al v. Poder
Ejecutivo). On 21 August 2015, the highest admin-
istrative court effectively annulled several of the
provisions that limit the exercise of conscientious
objection (CO).11
Human rights standards and legal
barriers to accessing abortion services
Sexual and reproductive health-related rights have
been increasingly recognised and elaborated in
international human rights law. The UN human
rights system has repeatedly conﬁrmed these rights
as human rights, ﬁrst enshrined under the right to
health in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.12
The International Conference on Population
and Development (ICPD) (Cairo, 1994) transformed
the discourse from reproductive control as a strat-
egy to meet demographic targets and control
population growth to a more comprehensive and
positive approach to sexuality and reproduction.
ICPD forged the link between sexuality and health
as human rights, where women’s agency over their
own bodies and sexuality is intrinsically linked to
their SRH.13 The Beijing Platform for Action
expanded the ICPD deﬁnition to cover both sexu-
ality and reproduction by upholding the right to
exercise control over and make decisions about
one’s sexuality.14 Among their many achievements,
these documents recognised the duty of govern-
ments to legislate on the matter, translating inter-
national commitments into national laws and
policies.15
In March 2016, the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights adopted GC 22, aiming
to assist State parties with the implementation of
their international obligations to realise SRH.2
Among others, GC 22 afﬁrms that states have an
obligation to adopt “appropriate legislative”
measures in order to achieve the full realisation
of SRH. Other UN bodies, such as the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women Committee (CEDAW), have also
recognised that legal arrangements are key to
realise SRHR and warn of the dangers of
“inadequate” laws.16 For example, the Committee
has noted how the “inadequacy of the existing
law on abortion contributed to the problem” of
high rates of maternal mortality due to unsafe
abortions being carried out.17 For that reason,
the UN bodies have recommended that states be
proactive in the adoption of a legal framework
on SRHR.18
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According to GC 22, states have an obligation to
repeal or eliminate laws, policies, and practices
that criminalise, obstruct, or undermine individ-
uals’ or particular groups’ access to SRH facilities,
services, goods, and information. This, as the GC
makes clear, is a “core obligation” – one that is
deemed two-fold in this analysis.
Obligation to reform laws that impede the
exercise of the right to SRH and immediate
obligation to eliminate discrimination
On one hand, GC 22 afﬁrms that states are under
an “immediate obligation” to eliminate discrimi-
nation against individuals and groups, and to guar-
antee their equal right to SRH. The GC outlines that
the realisation of women’s rights and gender
equality requires states to repeal or reform any dis-
criminatory laws, policies, and practices in this
area. Laws that criminalise or restrict abortion
are cited by GC 22 as examples of laws that must
be repealed.2
The CEDAW Committee has also recommended
taking steps toward the decriminalisation of abor-
tion, requiring countries to modify or repeal the
existing abortion legislation to ﬁt with obligations
assumed internationally.19 The former Special Rap-
porteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, has
argued that “[c]riminal laws penalizing and
restricting induced abortion are the paradigmatic
examples of impermissible barriers… and must
be eliminated”.20
Obligation to remove and refrain from
enacting laws and policies that create barriers
in access to SRH services
On the other hand, states are required to remove
and refrain from enacting laws and policies that
create barriers in access to SRH services. GC 22
explicitly addresses the duty to remove all barriers
interfering with women’s access to reproductive
health services.2
Concretely, in relation to the tripartite typology
in human rights, GC 22 establishes that the duty to
respect requires states to refrain from interfering
with individuals’ exercising their SRH rights.
Examples include limiting or denying access to
health services and information, through laws or
practices that criminalise abortion or that require
third-party authorisation for access to abortion or
contraception, among others. Under the obligation
to protect, states must protect individuals’ SRH-
related rights from interference by third parties,
such as private health clinics, or insurance
companies that impose practical or procedural
barriers to health services. The obligation to fulﬁll,
in turn, also requires states to take measures to
eradicate practical barriers to the full realisation
of SRH-related rights, such as disproportionate
costs and lack of physical or geographical access
to SRH care.2
In L.C. v. Peru, the CEDAW Committee noted that
since the State Party had legalised therapeutic
abortion, it must establish an appropriate legal fra-
mework that allows women to exercise their right
thereto. The Committee built on the considerations
made by the European Court of Human Rights that
read “[o]nce the legislature decides to allow abor-
tion, it must not structure its legal framework in a
way which would limit real possibilities to obtain
it”.21 The UN Human Rights Committee also leaves
no room for doubt: “in cases where abortion pro-
cedures may lawfully be performed, all obstacles
to obtaining them should be removed”.22 Further-
more, the Special Rapporteur on Torture has indi-
cated that the denial of legally available health
services – such as abortion and post-abortion
care – can cause tremendous and lasting physical
and emotional suffering that can amount to tor-
ture or ill treatment.23
The decriminalisation/liberalisation of abortion
and the elimination of barriers in access thereto
are therefore also deemed vital to ensure compli-
ance with other core obligations set forth by
GC22: the obligation to prevent unsafe abortions.2
Legal barriers to access abortion services
in Uruguayan law
Besides the general obligations delineated above,
the UN system has grappled with an extensive list
of speciﬁc barriers and created clear guidelines
to assist countries in enacting/modifying/repealing
national laws so as to comply with their inter-
national obligations regarding SRH. While the Uru-
guayan legal framework on SRH and abortion
represents an important step toward the realis-
ation of these rights, a closer look reveals a num-
ber of burdensome requirements that must be
fulﬁlled by the woman seeking access to the abor-
tion service. This section assesses some of these
requirements in light of the human rights stan-
dards discussed in the previous section.
First of all, it is noteworthy that abortion
remains a crime under Uruguayan law; the abor-
tion law merely waived criminal punishment
when abortion is performed under very speciﬁc
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circumstances and after complying with an exten-
sive list of requirements. For some of the actors
involved in the parliamentary discussion, this legis-
lative amendment brought no real change as the
voluntary termination of pregnancy continues to
fall within the ambit of penal law.24 Hendriks
notes that the exposure of women to human rights
violations as well as to health damage is often per-
petuated by criminal laws, which represent the
most onerous, intrusive, and punitive of state
powers and should be invoked only where it offers
a necessary and proportionate means to achieve
an important objective.25 Thus, the Uruguayan
abortion law – although it represents a step toward
a more liberal approach – falls short of the obli-
gation to repeal or reform laws that impede the
exercise of SRHR.
Besides the extensive criticisms related to the
regulation of abortion as a criminal matter –
with the pervasive stigma and negative conse-
quences that it entails – the requirements
prescribed by Uruguayan law for women seeking
to lawfully access abortion services 26 constitute a
violation of the duty to respect SRH-related rights.
Under these rights, states are required to remove
and refrain from enacting laws and policies that
create barriers to access to SRH services.2
The abortion law presents a barrier in terms of
gestational limits for abortion: lawful abortion is
only available within the ﬁrst 12 weeks of preg-
nancy. Where the pregnancy results from rape,
contingent on certain procedural requirements,
abortion is permitted up to 14 weeks. According
to the abortion law, in order for the termination
to be legal – and thus not a crime punished accord-
ingly – the woman needs to go through the follow-
ing chronological steps: (a) a medical consultation
with an obstetrician/gynecologist; (b) a second con-
sultation with an interdisciplinary team in order to
inform the woman of the procedure, its “inherent
health risks”, and the alternatives that exist; (c) a
mandatory waiting period of ﬁve days; (d) a consul-
tation to conﬁrm the woman’s willingness to follow
through with the procedure; (e) the abortion itself;
and (f) a post-abortion consultation.26
Three barriers that arise in the course of this
process are described below: waiting periods, man-
datory counselling, and problems related to CO.
Mandatory waiting period
As mentioned above, Uruguayan law requires a
ﬁve-day mandatory waiting period: the minimum
amount of time that is legally required to elapse
before a woman can continue to terminate her
pregnancy.27 According to the WHO, such a pro-
vision delays care, jeopardising women’s ability
to access safe abortion services and demeaning
them as competent decision-makers.28
The Guttmacher Institute reports that qualitat-
ive assessments of experiences with waiting-period
laws found that both patients and providers were
burdened in multiple ways by this obligation.29 A
delay of days or even hours may increase medical
risks by impeding earlier, safer abortions.30 A study
conducted in the US revealed that 70% of women
who had been required to go through a waiting
period before their abortion disapproved of such
a delay.31 Similar results were obtained in relation
to a 24-hour “reﬂection period”.32
Furthermore, GC 22 explicitly refers to manda-
tory waiting periods as a barrier to be eliminated
in that context.2 The CEDAW Committee – in line
with the recommendations of the WHO – has
also requested that countries remove the require-
ment of waiting periods, considering them to be
“medically unnecessary”. The Committee considers
even a 48-hour waiting period to constitute a
barrier to access that should be reviewed.33 Thus,
it urges states to ensure access to safe abortion
without subjecting women to mandatory counsel-
ling and deems the imposition of these require-
ments to be “aimed at restricting women’s access
to abortion”.34
Counselling and access to unbiased
information
The ICPD regards reproductive health care as
including access to information, education, and
counselling on human sexuality, family planning,
and responsible parenthood. The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General Com-
ment 14 has framed the right to information on
SRH as an essential component of the right to
health.35
Contrary to the UN bodies’ call for its elimin-
ation, the Uruguayan law requires multidisciplin-
ary mandatory counselling for women seeking
abortions. As described above, women are legally
required to consult three professionals who are
obliged to inform them of the “inherent health
risks” of the abortion procedure.26 The same
legal obligation is not extended to information
regarding pregnancy-related health risks.26 The
objective of this interdisciplinary counselling com-
mittee is to “contribute to overcome the causes
that lead to the interruption of pregnancy”,
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evidencing the deterrent intention of the pro-
vision. As mentioned earlier, Article 12 of Decree
375/2012 required physicians to refrain from mak-
ing any value judgment regarding the patient’s
decision to terminate her pregnancy and man-
dated that no further inquiry into her reasons be
carried out. This provision was, however, rendered
null and void by the decision in Alonso et al
v. Poder Ejecutivo.11 Consequently, women have
become exposed to stigmatisation or medically
inaccurate (or misleading) information about abor-
tion, putting lives at risk and forcing some women
to resort to clandestine abortions.36
In practice, this counselling requirement func-
tions as a form of third-party authorisation that
women need to obtain prior to accessing the ser-
vice. The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommen-
dation 24 notes that conditioning women’s access
to health services on the authorisation of hus-
bands, partners, parents, or health authorities is
a signiﬁcant barrier to the pursuit of their health
goals, deterring them from seeking and receiving
the information and services guaranteed by
law.37 The UN bodies have repeatedly called for
the elimination of counselling requirements and
GC 22 explicitly prohibits them.2,20
The counselling prerequisite is, in other words,
contrary to the obligations set by the international
legal framework; GC 22 considers that state-
imposed legal barriers that undermine SRH rights
and/or a failure to take the measures necessary
to eradicate such barriers violate the governmental
obligation to fulﬁl these rights.2
Conscientious objection
The scope of CO is regulated generally by Law
18.987 and in more detail by the adjusted version
of Decree 375/2012 following Alonso et al. That
said, it is important to note that invoking CO has
had signiﬁcant and very real consequences in
practice.
Research conducted by MYSU (Women and
Health Uruguay) indicates that an alarming num-
ber of doctors refuse to perform abortion by rais-
ing a CO defence. Concretely, this means that
healthcare professionals – and corporations –
exempt themselves from providing abortion care
on religious, moral, and/or philosophical grounds.
MYSU’s research shows that in some areas of the
country up to 87% of medical service providers
refuse to terminate pregnancies, making it vir-
tually impossible to obtain timely access to ser-
vices.36 One study concluded that doctors are
collectively practicing ofﬁcial disobedience and
resisting the law, thereby impeding women’s
access to care.38
Here again, the Uruguayan framework marks a
departure from the human rights standards set by
international human rights law. The former, for
example, introduces the notion of “ideological
objection” (“objeción de ideario”), enabling private
health institutions to invoke an institutional objec-
tion and abstain from providing abortion services
altogether.38 Moreover, the decision in Alonso
et al v. Poder Ejecutivo enables doctors to refuse
participation in any of the steps relating to the ter-
mination of pregnancy (not only the abortion pro-
cedure), hindering access to pre- and post-abortion
care.11
The formulation of CO provided in this frame-
work prevents patients from receiving accurate,
scientiﬁc, and unbiased information about their
options, and thus inhibits their ability to access
such care, clashing with the obligations assumed
at the international level.39 Firstly, the obligation
to protect requires states to prohibit and prevent
private actors from imposing practical or pro-
cedural barriers to health services.2 In this regard,
states must organise health services in a manner
that ensures that “the exercise of CO by health pro-
fessionals does not prevent women from obtaining
access to health services”.40 Secondly, the CEDAW
Committee clariﬁed that “if health service provi-
ders refuse to perform such services based on CO,
measures should be introduced to ensure that
women are referred to alternative health provi-
ders”.37 According to GC 22, states must appropri-
ately regulate this practice to ensure that it does
not inhibit anyone’s access to SRH care, including
by requiring referrals to an accessible provider
capable of and willing to provide the services
being sought.2 And thirdly, states must guarantee
the performance of services in urgent or emer-
gency situations.2 The Uruguayan framework
does not meet any of these standards.
Moreover, in July 2016, the CEDAW Committee
considered the reports from Uruguay and noted
its concern about the widespread use of CO
among medical practitioners, “thereby limiting
access to safe abortion services, which are guaran-
teed by law”.41 It recommended that the state take
active measures to ensure that women have access
to legal abortion and post-abortion services, and
“introduce stricter justiﬁcation requirements to
prevent the blanket use by medical practitioners
of their right to CO to performing an abortion”.41
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Conclusions and perspectives for the
future
Policies and laws that act as barriers to the avail-
ability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality of
SRH services remain an area of serious concern
worldwide. A critical analysis of the existing dom-
estic legal framework in light of these standards
is crucial for the further modiﬁcation and advance-
ment of these rights in practice. This article reveals
that – in spite of its praise at the international level
and the adoption of a less restrictive abortion law –
Uruguay has fallen short of adopting a legal frame-
work that complies with international standards
and that guarantees effective access to abortion
services. The requirements set by the law not
only violate the obligations to eradicate barriers,
limiting women’s access to lawful services, but
also result in inequities in access and create dispro-
portionate risks for poor women, young women,
ethnic minorities, and other women in vulnerable
positions. After all, these women often do not have
the resources – time, money, transportation means
– and knowledge to face all the obstacles required
by law.36 Moreover, these barriers make access
unduly burdensome for women who experience
gender-based violence or sexual violations, and
who are twice as likely to need abortion services
as women who do not experience such violence.42
Fortunately, the shortcomings of the Urugua-
yan legal framework have reached the parlia-
ment and a draft that eliminates many of the
above-mentioned barriers has been submitted.
In the wake of legal reform, it is important
that law-makers, as well as health and human
rights advocates, follow these developments care-
fully in order to keep compliance with the inter-
national human rights framework in mind. States
Parties should, after all, be guided by contempor-
ary human rights instruments and jurisprudence,
as well as the most up-to-date international
guidelines and protocols established by the UN
agencies.
The Uruguayan “harm-reduction” approach has
been replicated in different countries, successfully
reducing maternal mortality rates and promoting
SRHR and gender equality. Although legal solutions
are not so easily transplantable, Uruguay now has
the chance to bring the abortion law in line with
global human rights standards. And by doing so,
it can continue to be an SRHR champion serving
again as a model, this time to advance law and pol-
icy reform in the region.
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Résumé
La santé sexuelle et procréative a acquis de plus en
plus d’importance dans le droit international relatif
aux droits de l’homme. Le travail des organes des
Nations Unies, en particulier l’observation générale
n°22 récemment adoptée [par le Comité des droits
économiques, sociaux et culturels], a été détermi-
nant pour signaler l’importance du cadre juridique
de la santé sexuelle et génésique et pour déﬁnir des
directives claires qui aident les pays à promulguer/
modiﬁer/abroger des lois nationales aﬁn de respec-
ter leurs obligations internationales dans ce
domaine. Même si, dans sa région, l’Uruguay est
considéré comme un pionnier du point de vue de
la condition et des droits de la femme, y compris
la santé et les droits sexuels et génésiques, les don-
nées mettent en évidence plusieurs obstacles. Cet
article étudie dans quelle mesure la loi uruguay-
enne sur l’avortement respecte les obligations inter-
nationales du pays enmatière de droits de l’homme
telles que conceptualisées dans l’observation gén-
érale. Il se sert de la législation uruguayenne sur
l’avortement, de son décret d’application et de la
décision de la plus haute cour administrative dans
l’affaire Alonso et al contre le Pouvoir exécutif
comme principaux axes de la discussion. Les résul-
tats révèlent que,malgré les louanges qu’il reçoit au
niveau international et l’adoption d’une loi moins
restrictive sur l’avortement, l’Uruguay n’est pas par-
venu à adopter un cadre qui observe les normes
internationales et garantisse un accès véritable
aux services d’avortement.
Resumen
La salud sexual y reproductiva (SSR) cada vez más
ha ganado importancia en el campo del derecho
internacional de los derechos humanos. El tra-
bajo de los organismos de las Naciones Unidas
(ONU), en particular la Observación General 22
(OG 22) adoptada recientemente, ha sido funda-
mental para señalar la importancia del marco
legislativo relativo a la SSR y para establecer
directrices claras que dirijan a los países hacia
promulgar/modiﬁcar/revocar las leyes nacionales,
con el ﬁn de que cumplan con sus obligaciones
internacionales en materia de SSR. Aunque den-
tro de la región Uruguay es considerado como
pionero en la condición social y jurídica y los
derechos de la mujer, incluidos la salud y los
derechos sexuales y reproductivos, la evidencia
indica varios retos. Este artículo explora en qué
medida la ley uruguaya relativa al aborto cumple
con las obligaciones del país con respecto a los
derechos humanos internacionales, conceptuali-
zadas en la OG 22. Utiliza dicha ley, su decreto
reglamentario y la decisión del tribunal adminis-
trativo supremo en Alonso Justo y otros contra
Poder Ejecutivo como los principales ejes del
debate. Los resultados revelan que – a pesar de
los elogios que recibe a nivel internacional y la
adopción de una ley sobre aborto menos restric-
tiva – Uruguay no ha llegado a adoptar un marco
legislativo que cumpla con las normas internacio-
nales y garantice acceso eﬁcaz a los servicios de
aborto.
L Berro Pizzarossa. Reproductive Health Matters 2018;26(52):1–8
8
